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From time immemorial, pilgrims, traders, artisans, and 
religious teachers going to Lhasa from Kathmandu had to 
decide between two main routes. One roughly followed 
the line of the present road to Kodari, crossed the border 
where Friendship Bridge is built and followed a steep trail 
to Kuti (Tib. Nyalam). Loads were carried by porters up to 
this point but pack animals were used for the rest of the 
journey. The alternative route went north on the route 
that vehicles now use to get trekkers through Betrawati 
and Dhunche to Syabrubesi, the start point for the popular 
Langtang treks. From there it was a twenty-kilometer trail 
following the Bhote kosi to cross the border at Rasuwa 
Gadhi. It was a further twenty kilometers, following the 
river trail, to reach Kyirong in Tibet. Besides being a 
staging post for mule caravans, Kyirong, like Kuti, was 
also a busy trading post where Nepalese traders from the 
border areas brought rice to barter for Tibetan salt.
The detail and hazards of both routes can be read in the 
accounts of the journeys made by the Lhasa-based Newar 
merchants of Kathmandu known as the Lhasa traders 
(Tuladhar 2004). They spent long periods in Lhasa but 
merchandise had to be regularly transported to maintain 
the stock in the trading houses located round the Barkhor 
in Lhasa, and the decision on what route to take must often 
have been an agonizing one. The Kathmandu to Kyirong 
journey was completed in nine stages on trails that are 
described as long, narrow and hard. The Kathmandu to 
Kuti journey was done in ten days and, if anything, the 
accounts suggest the trail was even more hazardous. 
Kathmandu Newars also permanently resided in Kuti and 
Kyirong to aid the transshipment of goods and to carry 
out major trading on their own account. Jest records that 
as late as 1959 there were forty five Newar households in 
Kyirong and forty in Kuti (Jest 1993). 
The two routes were used for the invasion of Tibet in 1788 
and 1791 by the forces of the recently formed Gorkha 
state under the direction of Bahadur Shah, which led to 
the plundering of Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. The 
routes were also used by the Manchu armies when they 
launched their powerful counter offensive in 1792. When 
Jung Bahadur Rana launched his unprovoked war against 
Tibet in 1855, he divided his attacking forces between 
both routes, and built a fort at Rasuwa Gadhi as part of the 
preparation for the invasion.
In 1961 when the Chinese proposed the building of a road 
to connect Lhasa to Kathmandu, both the Kyirong and Kuti 
routes were given serious consideration. How one came to 
be selected rather than the other is an interesting tale well 
told by Rose (1971). On 25 September 1961, King Mahendra 
set off on 17-day state visit to China and Outer Mongolia. 
He had a well-earned reputation for skill in handling 
pressures from India and China, and turning them to his 
and Nepal’s advantage. It is clear that throughout the visit 
he was on maximum alert to resist Chinese blandishments 
to say anything that would offend India. The stated 
purpose behind the visit to Peking was the signing of a 
boundary agreement but, totally unexpectedly, on the last 
day of the visit, an agreement to construct the road was 
signed. Though not discussed during the visit, the Chinese 
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presented a draft road agreement to Mahendra on the day 
before his departure and to quote directly from Rose, “in 
such terms as to imply that implementation of the treaty 
depended upon a favorable response to the road question. 
Having been badly outmaneuvered for once, the King was 
in no position to resist the pressure” (1971: 238-239). 
Dr. Tulsi Giri, who was accompanying Mahendra, signed 
the agreement for Nepal, but this did not deflect Indian 
anger towards Mahendra. The Chinese were insistent 
on immediate implementation. Survey teams did their 
work in early 1962 and proposed two routes, one through 
Rasuwa Gadhi and the other through Kodari, with a 
strong preference for the former as it was shorter and 
traversed easier terrain. Possibly hoping to postpone the 
construction for as long as possible, Mahendra insisted on 
the Kodari route. Within a remarkably short time, work 
started and the road was completed in 1966.
A visit in March 2013 confirmed that the section of the 
road (now called the Araniko highway) from Kathmandu 
to Bahrabise is reasonably well maintained but the 26 
kilometers up the steep sided gorge from Bahrabise to 
the border is in a bad state. It is essentially a compacted 
and rutted dirt track susceptible in a number of places to 
major landslides, a situation made worse by unrestricted 
stone quarrying above the road at various points. The 
Chinese have recently started work on a dry port on the 
Nepal side to ease the congestion caused by the present 
archaic system for the transshipment of goods from Khasa 
(Tib. Zhangmu) on their side through the Tatopani custom 
offices on the Nepal side. They have black topped the 
road to the border, cutting the journey time from Kuti to 
about an hour. Little wonder they are showing signs of 
frustration and despair about the state of the road on the 
Nepal side, a point well illustrated by what the Chinese 
ambassador was quoted as saying on 23 December 2012 
when he laid the foundation stone for the new dry port. 
“As we are constructing a dry port on the Nepal-Tibet 
border we must repair the Araniko highway. Come up with 
a proposal. China is ready to help repair it” (Dangal 2012). 
Local traders are also quoted in the article as blaming 
the government for doing nothing to improve the road. 
Why Nepal is apparently dragging its feet can only be a 
matter of conjecture, but three days after the ambassador 
expressed his frustration on the issue, he attended a 
ceremony in Kathmandu at which a certificate was handed 
over to mark the completion of the Rasuwa Gadhi to 
Syabrubesi road, thus connecting Kyirong to Kathmandu 
exactly fifty years after China first proposed doing so. 
At a meeting held two days earlier, China had expressed 
interest in upgrading Nepal-China transit points and 
constructing other necessary physical infrastructures to 
facilitate trade with Nepal (Bhandary 2012). 
I first visited Rasuwa Gadhi in March 2006. Before doing 
so, I had read accounts by two of the first outsiders 
to visit the place: Tillman in 1949 (Tilman 1952) and 
Forbes in 1956 (Forbes 1962). In his inimitable way, 
Tilman describes his walk to the border through the 
Tibetan speaking village of Timure with “its row of five 
noble and ancient chortens” where “some land-hungry 
heathen had planted and fenced his maize so that the 
south-bound traveller must pass them, willy-nilly, on the 
unlucky side.” At Rasuwa Gadhi, “lying in the narrowest 
and deepest part of the gorge,” he found a few soldiers 
on the Nepal side but on the Tibetan side, apart from a 
stone slab inscribed with Chinese characters, “there was 
nothing, not even an empty sentry box, to denote one 
had crossed a frontier.” He pitched his tent “within a 
substantial stone fort, its walls embrasured for cannon 
and loopholed for rifles, and squeezed between the 
Trisuli river and one rock wall of the gorge” (1952: 53-54). 
Forbes also commented on the Timure chortens and on  
the fact that there were some friendly Indian policemen  
manning a signal station in the village. Presumably this 
was one of seventeen such stations established across 
Nepal’s northern border by secret protocol in 1950. They 
stayed until Mahendra requested their removal in 1969. 
Forbes also found little sign of activity on the Tibetan side 
of the frontier but he did photograph the inscription on 
the stone slab and later had it translated. It was erected on 
November 26, 1792 and refers to the demarcation of the 
frontier after “the victory over the Gorkhas accomplished 
by General Fu, the Great General for the Pacification of 
the West”. Forbes also gives a translation by Sir Charles 
Bell of the inscription on a famous pillar in Lhasa which 
describes in great detail and colorful language the victories 
by the Manchu armies “in the land of thieves” where they 
“traversed the mountains, so difficult to pass through, as 
though they were moving over a level plain and crossed 
rivers with great waves and narrow gorges as though they 
were small streams” (1962: 126-130).
In 2006 I found that apart from a new footbridge, a two-
storey building on the Tibet side and two small huts on the 
Nepal side, very little had changed since Tilman and Forbes 
had visited. It was delightfully tranquil. The chortens in 
Timure were still as impressive as ever and the walls of 
Jung Bahadur’s fort were well preserved. A prominent 
notice in Nepali and English close to the fort helpfully 
summed up the historic importance of the place:
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Figure 1: The river junction at 
Rasuwa Garhi in 2006. From the 
right, the Lende Khola joins the 
Bhote Kosi which flows down the 
valley from Kyirong, A footbridge 
leads to the buildings across the 
frontier. 
(Sam Cowan 2006)
Figure 2: The river junction in 
2013. Behind the temporary 
military-style bridge are the 
concrete supports for the new 
fly-over bridge. The five-storey 
structure was built recently and 
extensive building work is still 
going on. 
(Sam Cowan 2013)
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Rasuwa Fort was a major gateway for the traders 
of Nepal and Tibet since the ancient time. It had 
remained a major passway and center for them up 
to the middle age (17th Century). The fort was built 
on the bank where two rivers, the Lingde River in 
the north and Kerung in the west, merge to form 
Bhotekoshi. It is said that, at the time of the war 
between Nepal and Tibet, during period of Baha-
dur Shah, the Chinese army marched across this 
passway to support the Tibetan army and pushed 
the Nepali army to Betrawati. Later at the time of 
the war between Nepal and Tibet, during period of 
Junga Bahadur Rana, the Nepali army reached Ker-
ung and Digarwa across this pathway. Rasuwa Fort 
was built during this war period in 1912 Bikram era. 
(Notice on Rasuwa Fort in 2006)
Just one historical detail is wrong. “The Chinese army” in 
1792 did not simply “march across this passway.” Rasuwa 
Gadhi was the scene of a ferocious three day battle which 
yielded a victory that was much acclaimed in Chinese 
sources as an outstanding feat of arms. It was the first 
battle on Nepal territory of the powerful Manchu counter 
offensive launched in response to the invasion of 1791. 
The Gorkhas had sensibly destroyed the bridge over 
the Lende River and the setting in the steep and narrow 
gorge greatly favored defenders, leaving attacking forces 
with little scope to maneuver. The Manchu forces were 
commanded by two very gifted and highly experienced 
commanders, Generals Fukangan and Hailancha. The three 
regiments commanded by Fukangan managed to throw 
a bridge across the river and seized the checkpoint while 
two regiments under Hailancha secretly crossed the river 
upstream on rafts, skirted the mountains and managed to 
emerge above the enemy camp to combine with Fukanga’s 
regiments to rout the Gorkha forces (Boulnois 1989). 
I returned to Rasuwa Gadhi in March 2013. The new road 
from Syabrubesi is very impressive. It was built entirely 
by Chinese labor using their own trucks and road building 
equipment. It is not yet black topped, but the strong 
foundations are in place to make that a straightforward 
task. The nine concrete bridges are clearly built to carry 
the heaviest loads and the safety barriers stand out as 
unusual compared with other roads in Nepal where such 
considerations are given a low priority.
The road runs by the river just below the village of Timure. 
The chortens are therefore untouched but the village is 
becoming a sprawl so characteristic of other areas of Nepal 
where new roads are being established. Well before the 
road was completed, press reports carried stories of locals 
seeing short term advantages such as shortening the time 
to get to Syabrubesi but expressing concern about the 
long term consequences: “All the land is being bought up 
by people from Trisuli and further south. Soon, the whole 
village will be owned by them, and we’ll have to resort 
to collecting firewood and fodder for money. The poor 
will just get poorer” (Sthapit 2011). There was also a large 
police presence in the village and endless checkpoints 
along the road. The charming hamlet of Gadhi, just 500m 
from the border, was unchanged, saved by having no space 
to build anything.
Inevitably the area around Rasuwa Gadhi had changed 
dramatically and the contrast between the two sides of 
the frontier was stark. On one side a new large and very 
impressive five-storey building: on the other, one new 
bungalow-style building and a ramshackle collection of 
huts. Most of the outer walls of the fort still stood but the 
definition of the fort away from the river had been lost. 
The Chinese have built a temporary military-style bridge 
to facilitate the vehicles and equipment necessary to 
build the road. Part of the walls of the fort near the river 
had been demolished to accommodate the road that runs 
over this bridge but this could be restored when the main 
flyover-style bridge is completed. The anchored retaining 
wall on the Chinese side and two large concrete central 
supports for this are already in place and, depending on 
how and where the anchored retaining wall on the Nepali 
side is built, it is possible that the bridge will go over 
the walls of the fort and therefore leave one of its most 
striking features untouched. However, on 10 July 2013 an 
article in Republica, five months after my visit, reported 
that four meters of the fort´s wall had already fallen down 
and cracks had developed along the length of the wall due 
to the use of heavy equipment and rampant extraction of 
gravel and soil for the ongoing construction of the bridge 
(Poudel 2013). The report also asserted that the local 
administration was trying “to fudge the issue” and that 
the Department of Archeology had initially objected to 
the bridge but gave conditional approval to construct it 
at least a foot above the fort, and in such a manner that it 
would not have any impact on the structure. It is hard to 
see such understandable concerns carrying much weight 
in the final analysis given the very high political profile of 
the project.
I searched but could not find the board which gave the 
history of the place. Perhaps a new one is being made. If so, 
I hope it is based, like its predecessor, on simple historical 
fact uninfluenced by contemporary political sensitivities.
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There is no doubting China’s commitment to making 
this second road crossing with Nepal a significant one in 
further boosting Chinese exports to Nepal. The railway 
from Lhasa to Shigatse will be completed this year and the 
next extension will be to Kyirong, where China is already 
spending large sums of money to turn it into a major 
business hub by upgrading its infrastructure (Basnet 2013). 
As it is, the trade imbalance is already starkly unequal. 
According to statistics compiled by the Trade and Export 
Promotion Centre, Nepal exported goods worth 1.21 billion 
Rupees to China and imported goods worth 30.59 billion 
Rupees from China in the first five months of the current 
fiscal year (Republica 2013). 
The figure for imports is almost certainly a gross 
underestimate because, as with most imports into Nepal, 
there is massive under-invoicing of goods entering 
Nepal at the Khasa/Tatopani border crossing with the 
connivance of officials on both sides. Significant imports 
from China, as with all countries except India, must be 
paid for through a dollar denominated Letter of Credit. 
However, to avoid customs duties, VAT and allied taxes, 
imports are invoiced at lower value and the balance is 
paid through informal channels, based entirely on trust, 
known as hundi (Kathmandu Post 2013). This is done, in a 
highly complex operation, mainly using remittance money 
converted into US dollars being channeled through Hong 
Kong from where it finds its way to the Chinese traders 
who have exported the goods to Nepal in the first place 
(Kathmandu banker, pers. comm. 2013). 
A formidable civil engineering challenge stands in the 
way of maximizing the use of the new road. The first five 
kilometers out of Syabrubesi has recently been black 
topped but the remaining ten kilometers to Dhunche, 
through the villages of Mulkharka, Ramche and Gadkhola, 
traverses one of the most landslide-prone areas in Nepal. 
Each monsoon season, the Kathmandu media regularly 
reports the cutting off of the existing road for days and 
sometimes weeks on end. Crossing the area in a vehicle 
at any time is slow and tortuous. Numerous geological 
reports spell out why this is so. The area is very close to 
the Main Central Thrust [MCT] of the Himalaya. This is 
the weak junction where the Indian plate slid under the 
Asian plate causing the Indian plate to shatter and crush. 
To quote one report, “it is one of the most tectonically 
significant structures in the Himalayan orogen. Detailed 
geologic mapping and structural analysis of the MCT 
in the Langtang National Park region of central Nepal 
reveals that this segment of the fault zone experienced 
multiple episodes of south-directed movement, under 
both brittle and ductile conditions, during the Tertiary 
period” (MacFarlane et al. 1992). To see what this means 
in practice today, go on YouTube to see any of the many 
video clips that numerous trekkers have uploaded to share 
the excitement of crossing the land-slide affected areas. 
Road repair and road building, and the continual vibration 
of the land caused by heavy traffic movement, as well as 
monsoon rainfall, add to the general instability of the soil 
in the area.
No doubt, with massive Chinese investment some 
improvement could be achieved, but it raises the question 
of why China is currently spending so much on improving 
Nepal’s infrastructure. Numerous politicians, bureaucrats 
and commentators in Kathmandu are constantly stressing 
the advantages which will open to Nepal if it can become 
the transit bridge of choice for trade between China 
and India. In my view, realizing such a prospect is a 
very long way off. Nepal would need to make massive 
improvements in its internal road transport network and 
in its merchandise and service handling capabilities to 
compete with the quantity and relative ease with which 
transshipments currently take place through the port of 
Calcutta. The reason for the ramping up of investment 
is based more on China’s priorities than Nepal’s. China 
wants to weaken India’s dominance in Nepali affairs and 
to strengthen its own influence but it recognizes that the 
weight of history, culture, religion and language works 
against achieving this objective. It sees making Nepal, 
including ordinary consumers, increasingly dependent 
on its goods and investment as the surest way to give 
it greater strategic weight to press its concerns on the 
Government of Nepal on all issues, and particularly on 
Tibetan affairs (anonymous contact, pers. comm. 2013).  
The new road from Kyirong through the historic crossing 
point of Rasuwa Gadhi will certainly play its part in that; 
and China clearly wants quick action. A high priced 
delegation arrived in Kathmandu on 31 March 2013 with 
the declared aim of seeking ways of expanding cooperation 
with Nepal. On the agenda was a request to the Nepal 
government “to speed up infrastructure construction at 
the Nepal-China border in Kerung-Rasuwa” (Ekantipur 
2013). 
What all this portends for Nepal was made clear in an 
article in the Nepali Times of 31 May 2013 which claimed 
that: “Chinese exports to Nepal have exploded in the past 
ten years. Affordable Chinese apparel have transformed 
the way Nepalis dress, and Chinese electronic goods and 
vehicles have flooded the market” (Kumar 2013). The 
same article noted that China is also upgrading the border 
facilities at Rasuwa Gadhi, “anticipating that most trade 
will move there once the highway on the Nepali side is 
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complete and the Chinese railway network arrives in 
Kerung via Xigatse.” All too clearly, there is much more 
of this “flooding the market” to come. The same issue 
carried an interview with Wu Chuntai, China’s ambassador 
to Nepal, under a heading of a quote from him that: “It 
is a win-win-win situation.” However, his answer to the 
question of what prospects he saw for balancing Nepal-
China trade is notably thin on substantive detail (Interview 
2013). 
Sam Cowan is a retired British general who knows Nepal 
well through his British Gurkha connections. He trekked 
extensively in east and west Nepal during his service, 
including during the Maoist conflict. Since his retirement 
eleven years ago, he has trekked at length through most of 
the Tibetan-speaking lands on Nepal’s northern border. He 
has written about the Maoist conflict, including an article: 
“Inside the People’s Liberation Army: a Military Perspective,” 
published in the European Bulletin of Himalayan 
Research, Number 37, 2011 and in Revolution in Nepal: An 
Anthropological and Historical Approach to the People’s 
War (OUP Delhi, 2013). 
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Endnotes
1. Personal information in this paragraph from a senior 
banker in Kathmandu March 2013.
2. See, for example, covering just one section of the many 
landslide-prone parts of the road: “Landslide when Trekking 
in Langtang Valley Trekking”, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
fiDDPU9pyNc.
3. Insight shared by trusted contact who has interacted 
with senior Chinese officials. Kathmandu, March 2013.
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